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AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET CONTROL 
BEFORE AND AFTER THE INVASION 
by 
Sarah Spalding 
On December 27, 1979, the Soviet Union dealt the final blow to an already 
flagging detente with the United States. In what was seen by the then American 
President Carter and much of the international community as the most serious 
threat to world peace since World War II, Soviet troops began their assault on 
Afghanistan and its people. Although the Soviet Union has a history of invading 
other countries, and in fact invaded Afghanistan on a much smaller scale three 
times before 1979-in 1925, 1929 and 1930-, it was its first attack on a Third 
World country since 1946. 
Nearly five years after the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan is still occupied by 
its northern neighbor, and prospects for a withdrawal of troops in the near future 
are indeed not promising. In order to understand the invasion, and the contin-
uing occupation, of Afghanistan it is necessary to understand the Afghan peo-
ple and the evolving relationship between the two countries since the mid-forties. 
After World War II, the United States gave small amounts of aid to Afghanistan 
but recognized that, given its proximity to the Soviet Union, it was in the Soviet 
sphere of influence. Although the U.S. had some interest in maintaining 
Afghanistan's independence, the American government saw the country as of 
little importance. Consequently, when Afghanistan requested aid in the 1950's 
from the U.S., Washington not only refused, but instead armed Pakistan, which 
at the time was Afghanistan's enemy, and a friend to the U.S. Naturally, the 
Soviet Union was quick to help out, thus considerably increasing its influence 
and fostering Afghanistan's dependence on it. 
King Mohammad Zahir ruled over Afghanistan from 1933 to 1973. However, 
Prince Mohammed Daoud, the king's prime minister and cousin, was a more 
dominant figure in the government from 1953 to 1963. Though Daoud was ousted 
in 1963, he came back a decade later to establish the Republic of Afghanistan, 
of which he later became president and prime minister. 
While Daoud had forged close ties with the Soviet Union when he was prime 
minister under the king, by 1975 he began moving increasingly toward greater 
independence from the USSR. Given the fact that paranoia has long been a 
characteristic of the Soviets' outlook on the world, "what to Daoud may have 
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been merely an attempt to become non-aligned may have appeared to the Soviets 
as a shift to the American-Iranian-Pakistani camp" (T. Hammond 41). 
The communist party that had formed in Afghanistan in 1965, the People's 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), had two main factions until 1977. They 
were Khalq, whose leader was Nur Mohammed Taraki, and Parcham, whose 
leader was Babrak Karmal. Both factions had friendly relations with Moscow. 
More than anything else, opposition betwen the two factions resulted from the 
hatred Taraki and Babrak had for each other, although ideological factors were 
involved as well. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the reunification of the factions 
in 1977 took place without sizable pressure from the Soviet Union (Hammond 
49); Further, it would appear that the reconciliation occurred in preparation for 
the communist coup that would put Taraki into power. (The hypothesis that the 
USSR influenced reunificaton is by no means completely accepted. Bhabani Sen 
Gupta writes, "The Soviets, all available evidence suggests, had nothing to do 
with the April revolution in Afghanistan" (84). 
In addition to alienating the USSR with his increasing independence of 
Moscow, Daoud had aroused opposition domestically as well. He was seen as 
ineffective and bumbling, and as discontent grew among the Afghans, Daoud 
adopted severe methods of repression, these serving only to increase resistance 
to him (Eliot 83-4). This strenghtened communist determination in the Soviet 
Union and Afghanistan to oust Daoud and set up a communist regime. 
The murder of Mir Akbar Khyber (a well-k,nown Parcham ideologue) on April 
17, 1978, and the subsequent funeral procession of some ten-to fifteen thousand 
marchers staged by the PDPA set plans into motion. Though the coup probably 
had not been planned for so early a date, Daoud's arrest of leading leftists 
prompted the takeover (Arnold 66). 
Tun days after Khyber's death, Afghan troups took over Kabul where they met 
with little resistance except at the Presidential Palace. Even the Presidential 
Guard, however, had to surrender after twenty-four hours. Daoud was 
assassinated, and the Republic of Afghanistan became the Democratic Republic 
of Afghanistan two days later. 
While remaining secretary-general of the PDPA, Taraki became president and 
prime minister of the new regime and Amin and Babrak Karmal were given 
important positions in the Cabinet and the Revolutionary Council. From the 
very start of their reign, the new leaders repeatedly claimed to be non-aligned 
and non-communist, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. For example, 
the constitution of the PDPA states that the party's ideology is Marxist-Leninist 
and advocates "expanding and strengthening Afghan/Soviet friendly relations 
and such relations between Afghanistan and the socialist fraternity ... " 
(Constitution of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, as quoted in 
Hammond, 232). 
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Perhaps Taraki claims to be non-aligned in the hope that Afghanistan would 
continue to receive aid from the United States. Washington did in fact continue 
giving aid after the coup. Assistance was severely curtailed, however, after U.S. 
Ambassador Adolph Dubs was killed in February, 1979, after having been held 
hostage by opponents of the regime. Flagrantly disregarding concern for Dub's 
life, Afghan police opened fire, killing the U.S. Ambassador and two captors. 
Foreign Minister Amin made no apologies for what had happened, an act fueling 
Washington's anger over the incident. Nevertheless, some small amounts of aid 
were still sent to Kabul (Hammond 64-5). 
The rule of the communists may be characterized as inept and inhumane. The 
Taraki/Amin regime attempted to impose socialist reforms on a very traditional, 
deeply religious people (the population is nearly 100% Muslim), that could not 
accept the proposed changes, much less in the short amount of time they were 
expected to do so. In addition to the obstacle of an obvious lack of support, the 
regime had purged nearly all former administrators and replaced them with 
PDPA members with little experience. Additional factors complicated the 
implementation of the reforms. "As a country known for its high mountain 
ranges ... its vast ethnic and linguistic diversities, and its still insurmountable 
communications hurdles, Afghanistan has been least amenable to effective 
central control ... " (Agwani 9). Add to all this the many incidents of torture and 
arrest without specific charges, and it was inevitable that the Afghan people 
would revolt. 
Within just a few months of the communist takeover, various rebel uprisings 
cropped up in many provinces. In March 1979, freedom fighters actually took 
over the cities of Nuristan and Herat. While communist officials attempted to 
quiet the mujaheddin (holy warriers), their efforts were met with increased 
resistance. Clearly, the Afghan army was not able to deal effectively with the 
situation, prompting the Soviet Union to increase its guidance and aid to the 
communists. Moscow was certainly not pleased with the Taraki/Amin regime's 
failure to establish firm communist control in Afghanistan. 
Though Taraki was President, Amin was largely responsible for introducing 
the policies that incited rebellion. The Soviets apparently recognized this and 
desired his downfall. In September 1979, Taraki met with Brezhnev in Moscow 
and Amin's demise presumably was discussed. Amin evidently learned ofTaraki's 
plan; on the day after Taraki's return to Kabul, Amin fired three cabinet 
members crucial to the President's support. This made Taraki's plans almost 
impossible to carry out. Yet, he asked Amin to come to the Presidential Palace. 
Shooting broke out on Amin's arrival, but he managed narrowly to escape with 
his life and return later to arrest Taraki and assume the presidency. 
Afghanistan's first communist president was not heard from again. 
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The Soviet Union was undoubtedly unhappy with this ironic turn of events, 
although Amin received formal congratulations from Brezhnev on September 
19th. "The decision to intervene was taken probably in September after Amin 
had overthrown and killed Taraki ... and still totally failed to contain the 
insurgency which controlled at least one half of Afghanistan's 28 provinces" (Sen 
Gupta 85). Indeed, Amin's problem with the Afghan freedom fighters was ever-
present, despite his feeble attempts to portray himself as sympathetic to Muslim 
traditions and beliefs. The Afghans were not to be so easily convinced in light 
of his previous stands, and continued their opposition. The Soviet Union appar-
ently attempted to do away with Amin when they sent Lieutenant General 
Paputin to Kabul. Initially, he was trying to persuade Amin to invite Soviet troops 
to intervene in Afghanistan. Amin refused, and it is possible that Paputin tried 
to kill him in a shooting incident in Amin's palace in December (Hammond 98). 
At this point the Soviet Union presumably felt that a massive invasion was the 
only possible option. 
By the end of November, United States intelligence had noted Soviet military 
activists close to the Afghanistan border, but their objectives could not be deter-
mined. Within a relatively short time, however, there could be no mistaking 
Moscow's intentions. It was an impressive operation. The central communica-
tions complex was taken over. Batteries were removed from Afghan tanks to 
make certain that there would be no resistance. On December 27, leading Afghan 
dignitaries were invited to a reception at which they were all arrested. For days 
troops had crossed the border: by December 26, thousands of troops had arrived 
(Arnold 95). The following night Soviet troops descended on Darulaman Palace, 
Amin's home. After considerable resistance, Amin was shot and killed. 
As is the case with most actions by the Soviet Union, there is much speculation 
and debate about the USSR's reasons for its invasion. Though it is impossible 
to know exactly what their considerations were and how they weighed the 
importance of each, one can theorize about possible motives. One such motive 
is basically ideological in nature: the Brezhnev Doctrine. It puts forth the view 
that, once a country becomes communist, it must remain that way, and the Soviet 
Union must ·do anything possible to assure its continuity in the event of a threat 
to the regime. Moscow obviously perceived the possibility of Amin's overthrow 
by the increasingly effective freedom fighters, and saw the need for intervention. 
A related reason for the invasion may be the Soviet Union's desire to surround 
itself with subservient communist regimes. This defensive stance is somewhat 
understandable, considering previous invasions of the USSR by hostile neighbors. 
At the same time, it is not an acceptable reason for invasion. As Thomas 
Hammond points out, this argument would be " ... the equivalent of saying that 
any country has the right to attack its neighbors in order to make itself more 
secure" (134). As has already been noted, the USSR has had a history of invading 
other countries as well as being a victim of others' invasions. Thus the 1979 
invasion may be seen as just another in a series by an expansionist and im-
perialistic country. 
Certain geopolitical considerations are thought to have been contributing 
factors in the USSR's action in 1979. Russia's supposed drive for warm water 
ports is one consideration. According to this theory, championed by Palmerston, 
Russia invaded Afghanistan in order to get closer to the Indian Ocean. This may 
be largely seen as a distortion by the West of the 1940 negotiations between 
Molotov and Ribbentrop. The invasion seen as a move toward the Gulf and its 
oil is a more serious possibility and threat to the United States. Because Soviet 
fighter-bombers are so close to the Strait of Hormuz, the USSR could conceivably 
blackmail the Gulf-oil-dependent West. However, this view " ... overlooks the 
several alternative and attractive possibilities which the Soviet Union has of 
enhancing its oil supplies without . . . antagonizing the United States .. . which 
would inevitably lead to a major confrontation" (Darmodaran 22). 
The fact that detente was already waning by December 1979 unquestionably 
made the decision to invade easier for the Soviet Union since it probably felt 
it did not have that much to lose. While the USSR had done its share in 
weakening the detente, Moscow can accuse the U.S. of doing the same. In the 
U.S.'s growing involvement in Vietnam some twenty years earlier, one may find 
another reason for Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Although there 
are many differences between the two situations, they may be likened to each 
other in that involvement in both cases grew gradually. In both cases, when it 
appeared that superpower aid to a smaller country was not producing the desired 
effect, and native armies were not strong enough, the decision to intervene 
militarily came about. Thus, the Soviet Union got sucked into its decision because 
of its increasing involvement in Afghanistan's affairs. 
Finally, although the Soviets surely realized that their action would arouse 
criticism from countries all over the world, they almost certainly did not 
anticipate the overwhelmingly negative response they received. In particular, 
the Soviets did not expect the United States to react as strongly as it did. There 
were several reasons for this. First of all, the Iranian hostage crisis so totally 
gripped U.S. attention that perhaps the Soviets felt attention to their intervention 
in Afghanistan would be diminished by comparison. Reaction to the USSR's 
action would be lessened further, the Soviets reasoned, if the Untied States 
decided to intervene in Iran. The Soviet Union was also aware that many people 
in the United States were still recovering from the Vietnam experience. Few 
Americans seemed to support America's involving itself in the fight against 
communism, thus leading Moscow to assume that the U.S. would not try to stop 




the USSR militarily. In addition, Moscow saw President Carter as rather weak 
and indecisive. Perhaps the strongest basis for the USSR's anticipation of a weak 
U.S. response was the fact that recent events in Afghanistan had elicited little 
reaction in Washington. Aid still found its way to Afghanistan after the 
communist coup and after the murder of U.S. Ambassador Dubs. The message 
seemed to be one suggesting very limited interest in Afghan affairs; the Soviet 
Union indeed had little warning of what was to come. 
President Carter, furious over the Soviet intervention, responded immediately 
with strong verbal condemnation and sanctions against the USSR. The Carter 
Doctrine, set forth in a State of the Union address on January 23, 1980, sought 
to contain Soviet expansionism in the 1980's. Concern over the geostrategic 
position the Soviet troops had assumed with respect to the Persian Gulf led to 
Carter's asserting that the United States would, if necessary, use military force 
to repel a bid to gain control of the Gulf region (Sen Gupta 8). In addition, the 
SALT II treaty was withdrawn from consideration by the Senate, grain shipments 
to the Soviet Union were severely cut back, Soviet fishing in U.S. waters was 
curtailed, export of high technology was stopped, the Moscow 0 lympics were 
boycotted and a new emphasis was placed on strengthening our military. There 
were numerous other steps taken to punish the Soviets as well (Hammond 
123-24). 
If Moscow was unprepared for American reaction against the invasion, the 
impressive determination of the Afghan people to resist Soviet domination must 
have come as a surprise as well. The Afghan freedom fighters put up massive 
resistance in 1979, and have sustained that effort for nearly five years. Despite 
Babrak's attempt to Sovietize Afghanistan by relinquishing important decision-
making to the Soviets and patterning Afghan institutions after those in the 
USSR, Afghan people have united to form a national liberation movement. 
Though the "rebel groups are divided along linguistic, cultural, tribal, 
ideological, and political lines ... "all have the common objective of ridding their 
country of Soviet influence (Hammond 157). 
These mujaheddin are fighting ajihad (holy war) against the atheistic Soviets. 
They are extremely resourceful, attacking enemy troops in any way they can. 
Many of their guns are obtained from deserting Soviet and Afghan soldiers, 
others are provided by the United States, China, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other 
countries. Weapons, nonetheless, are in short supply, and the mujaheddin are 
often powerless against superior Soviet arms. Afghan villages have been bombed, 
crops destroyed by fire, water sources have been contaminated. Chemical warfare 
has been used extensively by the Soviets. "The number of Afghans actually killed 
by chemical attacks, said the State Department, might be ... more than 6,000" 
(Hammond 162). Despite all this, the resistance has only grown and become more 
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determined and better organized. "The men ... are fighting not only for their 
home but also for their companions throughout their once faction-ridden 
homeland. The Soviets, it seems, have succeeded only in uniting the resistance 
they had hoped to shatter" (Schultheis 27). 
The continuing Soviet occupation in Afghanistan has assumed the strange 
equality of a stalemate that the Soviets appear to accept willingly. Despite the 
optimism that some feel about a Soviet withdrawal of troops, the probability 
of this coming about is not very high. Simply put, "Russia cannot defeat the 
tribesmen, yet it cannot withdraw without losing all that it has fought for" (US. 
News & World Report, 10). Withdrawal would mean an ideological retreat and 
would weaken the USSR's strong, tough image. The Soviets would also lose the 
strategic position they now have with respect to the Gulf, the Indian Ocean, 
and border countries. 
For the same reasons, the chances of Afghanistan becoming neutral and non-
aligned as it was before the 1978 coup seem slim at best. Jagat Mehta has 
proposed that the Soviets now see that the invasion was a mistake and that 
Afghanistan should become neutral once again (J. Mehta 139-53). 
At the same time, however, Moscow has lost large amounts of money and lives 
in an effort to control the country. This would appear to have all been for nothing 
if Afghan neutrality were to be the solution. Even ifthe Soviet Union could ac-
cept what they would view as a tremendous loss of face, the idea of Afghanistan 
becoming truly neutral after what they have suffered at the hands of Moscow 
is far-fetched. 
While it does not seem likely that Soviet troops will withdraw, Moscow pro-
bably will not want to send more troops in, either. Considering the sad state 
of the Soviet economy and its labor shortages, the USSR cannot afford to deploy 
additional manpower. Perhaps the Soviets have also learned something from the 
American involvement in Vietnam. 
It seems that, for the time being, the Soviet Union will continue to occupy 
and force itself upon Afghanistan, while the Afghan people will continue to fight 
back. But while it is true that the resourceful freedom fighters have surprised 
the world with their determination, one has to wonder how long they can 
continue their crusade, given their shortage of weapons and the overall military 
superiority of the Soviet Union. As Hammond puts it, "The people of Eastern 
Europe ... are anticommunist and anti-Soviet, but this has not prevented the 
communist regimes ... with Soviet support, from maintaining themselves ... 
Afghans will probably suffer the same fate" (Hammond 195). 
Indeed, the Afghans will continue to suffer. One Afghan refugee in Pakistan, 
one in the more than four million who have fled to Pakistan and Iran because 
the Soviets have destroyed their villages, speaks for his displaced countrymen: 
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I don't know what will happen to the mujaheddin in Afghanistan. 
The Russians have no concept of human life ... The people who lived 
in the valley were very poor. But they were happy with their 
families, their children. Now their life is no more, it has been 
crushed, destroyed by the Soviet armies. For what? (Frumkin 61) 
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